The case for the long-stop has not been made

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With regard to the news story: ‘Apply high court time-bar ruling to IFAs: Apfa’ (FA 12 March) as usual, this discussion is doing the case for the long-stop more harm than good.

First, the English courts have rejected the Human Rights Act argument already. In Heather Moor & Edgecomb, the European Court of Human Rights concluded that Fos’ entitlement not to apply the law was legal. The Court in Stubbings said that it was not a breach of human rights to have a time-bar, but it did not conclude or even hint that a time-bar was a human rights requirement. (The House of Lords subsequently overruled the decision that the Stubbings case – one about child abuse – was time-barred).

The Mercer case has nothing to do with the long-stop. It was decided on the basis of section 14A of the Limitation Act, which is broadly replicated in DISP 2.8.2, and bars a complaint made more than six years from the event if three years have passed since the claimant should have known that he had cause for complaint.

Both the Court of Appeal and the European Court of Human Rights rejected the argument about the rule of law in the Heather Moor & Edgecomb cases.

The string of largely inaccurate comments in response to the story put back the policy arguments for a back-stop for small firms who need it every time they are made. If you want a long-stop, get your facts and law right. Parliament has had three looks at this in 2000, 2010 and 2012, and rejected the argument on each occasion. So lobbying has to be a lot more skilled than this.

Adam Samuel

Compliance consultant, London

(Mel: Is this complete sign-off?)