Since coming to power in December 2012, Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe has pulled off a number of miraculous tricks.
Firstly, he sidestepped concerns on fiscal solvency to ensure the passage of a ¥13trn (£87.5bn) supplementary budget in February. Then, he presided over a transformation at the Bank of Japan (BoJ) in April, with incoming BoJ governor Haruhiko Kuroda announcing a new 2 per cent inflation target amid a shift in monetary policy. Finally, in June, Mr Abe presented a wide-ranging package of reforms as part of a ‘growth strategy’.
Yet, while his daring stunts have already wowed a rapt audience, there are few signs that he is about to disappear in a puff of smoke. Indeed, having recently secured the type of broad political support that has eluded the majority of Japan’s 32 post-war prime ministers, he may finally be able to push through much needed reforms. But what will be Mr Abe’s next move and will investors be amused?
The most potent mix of policy response is likely to continue to focus on driving Japan out of its current deflationary quagmire. BoJ governor Mr Kuroda recently reiterated his belief that the current policy framework, including the increase in the monetary base (at an annual pace of ¥60-70trn), will be sufficient to achieve the Bank’s 2 per cent inflation target. Certainly, the economy does appear to be on track with expectations at the BoJ – in April, the Bank predicted that the economy will return to a moderate recovery path around mid-2013.
Yet, in spite of recent improvement, it is worth pointing out that achieving the inflation target outlined by the BoJ is central to all other aspects of Abenomics. If there was to be any slippage on this front, the credibility of the second and third of Mr Abe’s arrows – fiscal flexibility and a growth strategy – would also come into question. Consequently, investors are probably right to assume that more action is possible if inflation disappoints.
Let us next consider how Mr Abe’s fiscal strategy may develop in the coming months. Much has been made of the huge debt obligations of the Japanese government, with debt-to-GDP now close to 220 per cent. In addition, the economy is hindered by poor demographics and a considerable public welfare burden.
